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Monetary policy challenges during the crisis in a small open 
dollarised economy: the case of Hungary 
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1. Introduction 
Inflation targeting as a choice for the monetary policy framework has become widespread in 
the past two decades, first in the advanced economies and then in the emerging economies 
as well. It is currently the policy regime of several central and eastern European (CEE) 
countries, including Hungary.  
While the recent financial crisis has not undermined support for inflation targeting 
frameworks, the passive policy approach of recent decades to manage risks related to 
financial stability has been called into question. The argument in favour of a passive 
approach was that in the case of the financial intermediation system, it is generally very 
difficult to tell what constitutes excesses in terms of either volumes (credit growth, 
dollarisation) or prices (asset price bubbles, exchange rate misalignments). “Cleaning up” 
after a bubble bursts by providing the necessary lender-of-last-resort facilities has been 
regarded as a cost-minimising strategy. Since the crisis, however, a consensus seems to be 
emerging that a more pro-active application of macroprudential and microeconomic 
regulatory and supervisory tools is necessary to limit the build-up of imbalances that could 
threaten financial stability.
1  
In emerging markets, liability dollarisation
2 gives rise to constraints and dilemmas in terms of 
both inflation targeting and dealing with financial stability risks. Intermediation in foreign 
currency reduces the efficiency of monetary transmission’s interest rate channel, while 
unhedged currency positions increase the vulnerability of the financial system to exchange 
rate shocks and decrease the efficiency of the exchange rate channel, the transmission 
channel that is particularly important in small open economies. 
The goal of this paper is to explore this topic using Hungary, a small open dollarised 
economy, as an illustration. Section 2 discusses the factors that led to a build-up of 
Hungary’s stock of foreign exchange (FX) debt. Section 3 turns to the effects of dollarisation 
on monetary policy transmission channels and financial stability. Section 4 investigates the 
short- and long-term policy measures that need to be taken to mitigate the potential costs of 
shocks in the future and to incentivise economic actors to create a more stable balance 
sheet structure. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Dollarisation in Hungary: nature and causes 
The experience of Hungary – and of some other CEE countries – with financial dollarisation 
is somewhat different from that of Latin American countries and the East Asian crisis 
economies in previous decades. In Hungary, dollarisation and currency mismatches have 
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2   By dollarisation we refer to the use of any non-domestic currency, not only US dollars. In eastern Europe 
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affected household balance sheets to a far greater extent than corporate balance sheets. 
The impact has been mainly on the liabilities side of balance sheets (liability dollarisation). 
Households’ FX debt has increased dramatically since accession to the European Union and 
now accounts for nearly 70% of total household liabilities – a level that is considered high 
even by CEE standards (Graph 1). More importantly, household FX debt represents about 
25% of GDP and thus constitutes a significant unhedged FX position, given that the incomes 
and wealth of households are principally denominated in forints. Corporate FX liabilities, 
while not insignificant, present less of a threat to financial stability, since the large share of 
exports in GDP implies a considerable inflow of foreign exchange, providing a natural – 
although usually only a partial – hedge for exchange rate effects related to FX liabilities.
3 
Graph 1 
Share of FX loans in the stock of household debt 
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AT = Austria; BG = Bulgaria; CZ = Czech Republic; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia;   
HU = Hungary; LT = Lithuania; LV = Latvia; PL = Poland; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; SI = 
Slovenia; SK = Slovakia; UK = United Kingdom 
Source: Hudecz et al (2010). 
The banking system only appears to have insulated itself from the effects of exchange rate 
movements by assuming FX liabilities to match the FX loans extended to households. It is 
still affected by exchange movements through several channels.  
First, banks’ credit risk is highly correlated with the exchange rate. A depreciation of the forint 
brings about a revaluation in the (forint) value of loans, thus making them costlier to repay. 
Since most households receive their income in forints, the risk of default increases when the 
exchange rate depreciates, lowering the quality of banks’ loan portfolios.  
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Second, since a substantial portion of banks’ FX assets are matched by FX swaps, which are 
mark-to-market margined instruments (unlike FX loans to households), a deterioration in the 
exchange rate leads to an immediate revaluation of banks’ liabilities and margin calls – the 
obligation to provide cash collateral to the counterparty that supplied the FX liabilities.
4 Such 
margin calls represent a major FX liquidity requirement in times of stress. 
Third, pressures on FX markets and the associated higher costs of long-term FX funding 
trigger a shift into short-term FX swap instruments, whose frequent renewal requires 
constant access to FX liquidity.   
The literature on financial dollarisation considers several factors as responsible for the build-
up of FX balances. One necessary condition for dollarisation is an open capital account and 
financial integration. This condition was fully satisfied when CEE countries joined the 
European Union. Most studies find that the primary motive for dollarisation once the capital 
account is open
5 is the desire of a country’s residents to optimise their portfolios’ risk-return 
profile, based on backward-looking information. This involves borrowing in low interest rate 
currencies that in the past have tended either to be stable or to depreciate. In effect, 
households enter into a carry trade strategy by opting for low interest rate debt. Interest rate 
differentials and low exchange rate volatility are therefore key ingredients in (liability) 
dollarisation, which is confirmed by the experiences of Hungary and other CEE countries.  
Graph 2 
Banks’ FX lending and stock of net FX swaps 
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Source: Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
                                                  
4   FX swaps are only one of the instruments used to hedge the foreign currency exposure that results from 
FX lending. Banks also borrow FX from parent institutions and the wholesale market, and accept FX deposits. 
During the recent crisis, however, hedging by creating synthetic forwards through FX swaps was a key factor 
in increasing sensitivity to exchange rate developments. For a detailed treatment see Páles et al (2011). 
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On average, interest rates have been consistently higher in Hungary than in the advanced 
economies and in most of the CEE countries. The large interest rate differential is, in part, a 
result of the relatively high risk premium on forint-denominated assets, which in turn is a 
consequence of Hungary’s high fiscal deficit and excessive government indebtedness. 
Persistently high inflation has also contributed to the large differential. In CEE countries 
where interest rates have been lower, FX lending has been far less widespread. 
The impact of exchange rate volatility is in line with what one would expect. Liability 
dollarisation has been highest in countries such as the Baltic states that have fixed exchange 
rates. Because Hungary had an exchange rate target zone between 2001 and 2008, it 
engaged in more exchange rate smoothing  than the Czech Republic or Poland, which has 
resulted in a greater degree of dollarisation.
6  
The choice of Swiss franc-denominated loans by the majority of indebted Hungarian 
households also shows the importance of (backward-looking) expectations regarding interest 
rate differentials and exchange rate volatility. The lower interest rates carried by these loans 
had been the main reason that they were more attractive to Hungarian households than 
loans denominated in Hungarian forints or euros. In addition, the prospect of euro adoption 
along with the highly stable (until recently) Swiss franc/euro exchange rate seemed to 
promise tolerable FX risks.
7  
3.  Effects on monetary transmission and financial stability 
Liability dollarisation in Hungary has weakened monetary transmission through both the 
interest rate and the exchange rate channels.  
Because the majority of new loans issued between 2004 and 2008 were in foreign currency, 
financial deepening in the domestic currency came to a halt, which affected the interest rate 
channel. The ratio of domestic monetary aggregates to GDP has remained low by 
international standards and therefore – even though interest rate pass-through has been 
relatively strong on assets denominated in Hungarian forints – monetary policy has had a 
smaller impact on households’ consumption and savings decisions.
8 The interest rate 
channel in Hungary currently functions mainly through its effect on investments.  
The weakening of the exchange rate channel, which has traditionally been much more 
influential in Hungary, has had far more important consequences, especially since the 
beginning of the financial crisis. Households (and firms) with large FX debts respond to 
depreciations by reducing spending (as a result of higher interest payments and negative 
wealth affects), which partly offsets the positive effect on net trade and mitigates the impact 
on inflation. Calculations by Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) staff show that the traditional 
direction of the exchange rate channel (depreciation acting as a monetary stimulus) is still 
valid, but only if financial intermediaries do not react to exchange rate fluctuations.
9 
The contractionary effects of a depreciation may win out over its expansionary impact on net 
trade, however, if financial intermediaries tighten their lending standards. Stricter lending 
standards do not pose a problem only for borrowers burdened with debts in foreign currency; 
they also curtail new investments. The corporate sector can be especially hard hit due to its 
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heavy reliance on short-term loans, which, in turn, constitutes a major drag on growth. If 
financial intermediaries lose access to external funding sources (systemic sudden stops
10) or 
start to deleverage in an effort to deal with the impact of exchange rate depreciation, they 
may decide to ration lending. As described in Section 2, lenders are affected by exchange 
rate movements because depreciation can lead to a deterioration in portfolio quality and 
increased FX liquidity needs (margin calls) just when FX markets become highly illiquid.  
Although estimates are subject to considerable uncertainty, it is clear that even mid-sized 
depreciations may cause the sign of the exchange rate’s impact on output to revert and lead to 
contraction. The scale and abruptness of depreciations are especially important factors, as the 
literature and MNB staff calculations point out,
11 underscoring the non-linearity of the exchange 
rate’s impact. The more abrupt and significant the exchange rate movement, the harder it is for 
economic actors to adapt, and the greater the consequences for bank portfolios. Extreme 
movements may trigger fears of systemic events, causing bank lending to dry up, increasing 
credit and sovereign risk premia, and leading to capital flight. While policymakers would 
respond promptly to such a full-blown scenario, under fragile financial market conditions 
negative feedback loops may be set in motion even before critical levels of the exchange rates 
are reached. Therefore “leaning against the wind” and signalling the possibility of market 
intervention can help policymakers respond pre-emptively to prevent a precarious situation 
from spiralling into a crisis.  
Graph 3  
Increasing share of loans denominated in domestic currency 
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Source: Hudecz et al (2010). 
                                                  
10   Systemic sudden stops, which are often discussed in the literature (see for example Calvo et al (2008),) lead 
to depreciations that have a contractionary effect – at least in the short to medium run – that is stronger than 
the positive effect they have on a country’s competitiveness (Cespedes et al (2004), Krugman (1999)). 
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The stress tests conducted by central banks are important in helping the latter gauge the 
evolution over time of critical nominal exchange rate levels. The tests provide an indication of 
the effect on banks’ balance sheets and portfolio quality, and hence of the likely reactions of 
banks in terms of their lending activity. As households and banks adjust their portfolios – for 
example by decreasing the outstanding net amount of foreign currency liabilities – this 
induces a shift in the critical levels of these exchange rates, a dynamic aspect which has to 
be considered when evaluating stress tests’ results with a lag. 
4.  Implications for monetary policy in Hungary  
Liability dollarisation has both short-term and long-term implications for policy. The former 
refer to the immediate policy changes Hungary had to implement in order to contain the costs 
of the recent financial crisis, and include adjustments in both policy targets and policy tools. 
The latter refer to policy changes that can be implemented over a longer time horizon, when 
things have gone back to normal.  
Short-run constraints and policy responses 
An immediate consequence of the financial turmoil was a shift in the focus of Hungary’s 
monetary policy from price stability to financial stability. The policy response to threats to 
financial stability during the crisis was inconsistent with Hungary’s inflation targeting 
framework, since the crisis was expected to give way to a severe recession and 
disinflationary pressures, which would necessitate lowering the policy rate. However, the 
central bank had to proceed with caution, given the likely effects of an abrupt depreciation of 
the forint and the danger of setting off a self-reinforcing feedback loop in Hungary’s dollarised 
economy. In this environment, policymakers could follow inflation targeting policies only if 
large and abrupt depreciations of the exchange rate could be avoided. In other words, 
inflation targeting was constrained by concerns about financial stability. 
In October 2008, during the initial phase of the crisis, Hungary raised its key policy rate 
dramatically, by 300 basis points, as part of efforts supported by the European Union and the 
IMF to stop capital flight and stabilise the exchange rate after the significant initial 
depreciation. Monetary policy continued to take financial stability constraints into account 
even after consolidation had been achieved and financial markets stabilised. The policy rate 
was decreased very slowly, in light of the fact that maintaining a sufficient interest rate 
differential was necessary to minimise the risk of a sudden exchange rate depreciation. 
Gradually, however, the financial system – and, to a lesser extent, households – adjusted by 
strengthening their balance sheets, as revealed by the stress tests. From the central bank’s 
point of view, this adjustment gradually gave monetary policy more room for manoeuvre, 
allowing further rate cuts up until early 2010. 
Another key aspect of the policy response to the financial crisis was the increased use and 
importance of unconventional policy tools. In Hungary, as in other countries, the aim of 
stabilising the financial system by maintaining the functionality of financial markets became 
an important short-term objective of the central bank. Due to Hungary’s integration into 
European financial markets and increased foreign exchange funding, the liquidity shock in 
Europe quickly reverberated throughout Hungary. Yet Hungarian financial intermediaries 
without strategic investors from the euro area had no direct access to the crisis-management 
tools of the European Central Bank (ECB). This, in turn, required the MNB to create policy 
instruments that supported liquidity in both the FX and forint markets. MNB started providing 
EUR/HUF and CHF/EUR swaps to domestic commercial banks, set up a longer-term loan 
facility and purchased government bonds on the secondary market. These actions were 
arguably just as important in stabilizing the markets at the outset of the crisis as the 300 
basis point increase in the policy rate.  BIS Papers No 57  185
 
 
At the same time, policymakers recognised the necessity of raising the level of Hungary’s 
international reserves. At the beginning of the crisis, the low level of the country’s foreign 
reserves relative to the rapidly increasing short-term component of external debt was a factor 
contributing to the loss of investor confidence in forint-denominated assets. Thus, official 
lending from global institutions – the IMF and the European Union – was of critical 
importance, allowing the MNB to increase its international reserves significantly.  
Additional pressure was put on international reserves by the central bank’s swap facilities, 
which provide foreign currency liquidity to domestic banks. Various swap and repo 
agreements with the ECB and the Swiss National Bank allowed MNB to satisfy FX liquidity 
needs, at least partially, without draining reserves.   
The shift in monetary policy’s focus from price stability to financial stability meant that 
excessive and damaging shifts in the exchange rate were to be avoided. In such situations, 
foreign exchange intervention is always a possibility. The MNB’s intervention practice, as 
always, has been driven by the principle that interest rate policy is the primary tool to 
influence monetary conditions, and foreign exchange intervention is considered a temporary 
measure that may alleviate market dysfunctions and extraordinary fluctuations in the 
exchange rate. However, MNB never ruled out its potential presence on the FX market, thus 
maintaining a state of “constructive ambiguity”, which allowed the use of verbal interventions 
– the announcement of the Bank’s intention to channel FX-denominated transfers from EU 
funds to the spot market – in situations where market pressure was significant. These verbal 
interventions, which occurred once in 2009 and once in 2010, had a significant positive 
impact on exchange rate dynamics in times of stress. All in all, the actual market presence of 
the central bank was relatively rare, and involved relatively small amounts.  
Long-run perspective  
Thanks to the lessons learned from the crisis, a return to pre-crisis, “normal” conditions will 
not mean reverting to pre-crisis policy. The crisis demonstrated that current levels of financial 
dollarisation in some CEE countries, including Hungary, are excessive and constitute a 
significant risk to the stability of balance sheets of households and financial intermediaries.  
Although there are signs that economic actors now understand the risks involved in FX 
borrowing and have begun to adjust their portfolios accordingly, policymakers need to find 
ways to reduce the stock of foreign currency debt. Prudent fiscal policy is one way, since a 
lower fiscal deficit reduces external funding needs. Also, a sustainable fiscal path moderates 
the risk premium component of domestic interest rates and thus the interest rate differential. 
Most importantly for traditional monetary policy, devotion to strict inflation targeting with a 
flexible exchange rate regime would also provide important disincentives to borrowing in 
foreign exchange. Credible inflation targeting could lower inflation expectations and thus the 
interest rate differential, a key ingredient in dollarisation. Moreover, policies that avoid 
excessive exchange rate smoothing would make economic actors realise the true magnitude 
of the risks involved in foreign exchange borrowing. 
There are several other methods for addressing and discouraging dollarisation. One is 
regulation, eg establishing maximum loan-to-value ratios for different currencies and types of 
debtors. At the extreme there is the possibility of banning foreign currency lending altogether, 
which is practically the strategy being pursued by the current Hungarian government. 
However, such methods will require international coordination of regulations and supervision, 
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prevent foreign currency lending, which residents were able to circumvent by borrowing 
foreign exchange abroad.
12 
There have been discussions in Hungary about converting FX loans into domestic currency. 
However, debt conversion on a massive scale is probably infeasible. Regardless of the 
particular technique used, a conversion of FX loans into forints would necessitate swapping 
the FX funds matching such assets into forints as well, unless the banks are willing to 
assume the exchange rate risks themselves. Such a massive portfolio shift into forint-
denominated assets would be possible only at a considerable discount, which would lead to 
a large currency depreciation. As a result, someone – the households, the government or the 
banks – would have to absorb the losses resulting from the revaluation of the loan principal.
13  
The crisis also provided a lesson on the importance of maintaining adequate levels of foreign 
exchange reserves. It highlighted how important international sources of FX liquidity can be 
in complementing central bank reserves, either through credit lines or swap facilities. 
However, it also demonstrated that covering potentially volatile foreign capital inflows by 
keeping large reserves in anticipation of a possible future reversal of flows is probably not the 
first-best solution, and that more emphasis should be placed on avoiding the large-scale 
build-up of such inflows. 
5. Conclusion 
Financial dollarisation reduces the efficiency of monetary policy and increases risks to 
financial stability. A large stock of foreign currency debt weakens interest rate and exchange 
rate transmission channels. In small open economies such as Hungary, the weakening of 
monetary policy’s exchange rate channel is of central importance. The traditional inflationary 
effect of depreciation – transmitted through the channel of rising import prices and net trade 
– after a reduction in the policy rate is offset partly by a reduction in residents’ spending due 
to a revaluation of the stock of FX debt.  
Moreover, large and abrupt depreciations affect the financial system through deteriorating credit 
portfolios and increased FX liquidity needs, posing severe risks both for growth (banks cut back 
lending, effectively freezing investments) and for financial stability (as confidence in both the 
solvency and the liquidity of the banking system decline). The effect on growth and financial 
stability increases in a non-linear manner with the scale of exchange rate depreciation.  
Monetary policy has to deal with liability dollarisation in both the short and the long run. The 
potential for self-reinforcing feedback loops to develop as a consequence of large exchange 
rate shocks and capital flight requires pre-emptive policy measures. Such measures include 
implementing a cautious interest rate policy that takes financial stability constraints into 
account, intervening in FX markets verbally and – under extreme circumstances – directly, 
setting up liquidity-enhancing central bank facilities, and augmenting foreign exchange 
reserves through international credit and swap lines.  
There are signs that domestic economic actors have learned about the risks of FX borrowing 
and begun to readjust their liability portfolios. As things return to normal, fiscal and monetary 
policymakers should implement measures that discourage the build-up of excessive foreign 
currency debt stocks, such as economic disincentives or international coordination of 
regulation enforced by efficient supervision.  
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In the long run, an inflation targeting framework with a flexible exchange rate may be 
monetary policy’s most effective means of promoting financial stability and preventing liability 
dollarisation, since interest rate differentials and stable exchange rates are the two key 
factors in residents’ preference for FX borrowing. High interest rate differentials are often a 
consequence of persistently high inflation, and a credible inflation targeting regime and 
prudent fiscal policy would reduce spreads. Exchange rate stability is often supported by 
policy attempts to smooth short-term fluctuations, but smoothing conceals the risks involved 
in borrowing foreign exchange, unlike a flexible exchange rate regime. During the crisis, 
policy aimed at assuring financial stability was often at odds with Hungary’s inflation targeting 
framework, but, in the long run, policymakers will also be able to use inflation targeting in 
support of their financial stability objectives. 
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